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Abstract—Under the emerging network coding paradigm, in-
termediate nodes in the network are allowed not only to store
and forward packets but also to process and mix different
data flows. We propose a low-complexity cryptographic scheme
that exploits the inherent security provided by random linear
network coding and offers the advantage of reduced overhead
in comparison to traditional end-to-end encryption of the entire
data. Confidentiality is achieved by protecting (or “locking”) the
source coefficients required to decode the encoded data, without
preventing intermediate nodes from running their standard net-
work coding operations. Our scheme can be easily combined with
existing techniques that counter active attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal paper of Ahlswede, Li, Cai and Yeung [1],
where it is proved that the max-flow min-cut capacity of a
general multicast network can only be achieved by allowing
intermediate nodes to mix different data flows, a surge in
network coding research (e.g. [2], [3], [4]) has uncovered its
potential to provide higher throughput and robustness.
The basic idea behind network coding is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. Suppose that node 1 aims at sending bits a and b
simultaneously (i.e. multicast) to sinks 6 and 7. It is not difficult
to see that the link between nodes 4 and 5 results in a bottleneck
in the sense that either bit a is forwarded (in which case node 6
does not receive bit b), or bit b is sent (in which case node 7 will
receive incomplete information). It follows that although the
capacity of the network is 2 bits per transmission (because the
min-cut to each destination equals 2), this cannot be achieved
unless node 4 jointly encodes a and b, for example, through an
XOR operation that allows perfect recovery at the sinks.
It turns out that random linear network coding (RLNC),
explained in detail in the next section, is sufficient to reach
the multicast capacity of a network [5], [2], [4]. In addition,
robustness gains have been reported in packetized networks
with lossy links in [3]. The transition from theory to practice
is well illustrated by the Practical Network Coding scheme
proposed in [6]. Recent successful applications include peer-to-
peer networks (e.g. for content distribution [7], [8]) and wireless
networks [9], [10].
It is fair to say that current proposals focusing on security
aspects of network coding are mainly of theoretical nature.
References [11] and [12] present a secure linear network code
that achieves perfect secrecy against an external eavesdropper
The first two authors contributed equally to this work, which was partly supported
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Technology) under grants SFRH/BD/28056/2006 and SFRH/BD/24718/2005.
Fig. 1. Canonical network coding example: node 1 multicasts bits a and b to
nodes 6 and 7. If node 4 did not perform a simple encoding operation on the
incoming bits, the max-flow min-cut capacity of 2 could not be achieved.
with access to a limited number of links. A different threat
posed by “nice but curious” intermediate nodes is analyzed
in [13]. Active attacks, in particular Byzantine modifications,
are considered in [14], [15] and [16].
Motivated by the security challenges of emerging network
coded systems we present a lightweight cryptographic scheme
to ensure confidentiality in network coding, which leverages the
inherent security provided by RLNC to reduce the overhead
in comparison to end-to-end encryption of the entire data
flow. The main novelty of our approach lies in protecting (or
“locking”) the source coefficients required to decode the linearly
coded data, while still allowing intermediate nodes to carry out
the usual network coding operations on a set of coefficients
containing the “unlocked” coefficients followed by the “locked”
coefficients. Thus, our security mechanisms can be combined
with state-of-the-art network coding protocols without the need
to modify the coding procedures at the intermediate nodes.
As part of our contribution, we discuss in detail the threats
countered and the computational overhead incurred by our
secure network coding scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, Sec-
tion II describes the network model, the RLNC paradigm, and a
practical RLNC protocol. Then, Section III explains our security
scheme in detail. Its performance is evaluated in Section IV and
the paper concludes with Section V.
II. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
We start by describing our network assumptions, the basics
of RLNC and the threat model based upon which our security
design is built.
A. Network Assumptions
We consider a network abstraction where the source and
intermediate nodes have access to the identifiers of the sinks
(e.g. the IP addresses). This way, our schemes can be easily
adapted to the many classes of networks that share this charac-
teristic, in particular networks with no centralized knowledge of
the network topology or of the encoding functions. It is worth
pointing out that network coding has been proposed at several
different layers of the protocol stack, for instance [6] addresses
the network layer, whereas [7], [8] focus on the application
layer. Cross-layer protocols appear in [10].
We further assume that the source and sink nodes share
symmetric keys to encrypt data as needed. Several mechanisms
can be used for the exchange of shared keys, such as an
offline mechanism for pre-distribution of keys, an authentication
protocol such as Kerberos or a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
B. Random Linear Network Coding
Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) [4] is a distributed
methodology for performing network coding, in which each
node in the network independently and randomly selects a set
of coefficients and uses them to form linear combinations of
the data packets it receives. As shown in Figure 2, these linear
combinations are then sent over the outgoing links. In the
example, αi and βj are chosen at random from a finite field.
Each packet is sent along with the global encoding vector [2],
which is the set of linear transformations that the original packet
goes through on its path from the source to the destination.
The global encoding vector enables the receivers to decode
the original data using Gaussian elimination. If the coefficients
are chosen at random from a large enough field, the resulting
matrix is invertible with high probability, which explains why
this approach is capable of achieving the multicast capacity of
a network.
A framework for packetized network coding (Practical
Network Coding, PNC) is presented in [6], which leverages
RLNC’s resilience against disruptions such as packet loss, con-
gestion, and changes of topology in order to guarantee robust
communication over highly dynamic networks with minimal
(or no) control information. The most important items in the
framework are the packet format and the buffering model.
The packet format consists of the global encoding vector
(kept in the header) and the payload, which is divided into
Fig. 2. Linear operations at intermediate node v in the network. X(v, i)
represents the traffic generated at node v, Y (e1) and Y (e2) represent traffic
in the incoming links e1 and e2, respectively, and Y (e3) represent traffic
in the outgoing link e3. In linear network coding, we have that Y (e3) =P
i αiX(v, i) +
P
j=1,2 βjY (ej) [2].
vectors according to the field size (28 or 216, i.e. each symbol
has 8 or 16 bits, respectively). Each of these symbols is then
used as a building block for the linear operations performed by
the nodes.
The buffering model divides the stream of packets into
generations of size h, such that packets in the same generation
are tagged with a common generation number. Each node sorts
the incoming packets in a single buffer according to their
generation number. When there is a transmission opportunity
at an outgoing edge, the sending node generates a new packet,
which contains a random linear combination of all packets in the
buffer that belong to the current generation. If a packet is non-
innovative, i.e. if it does not increase the rank of the decoding
matrix available at the receiving node, then it is immediately
discarded. As soon as the matrix of received packets has full
rank, Gaussian elimination is performed at the receivers to
obtain the original packets.
C. Threat Model
We consider the threat posed by an attacker with the follow-
ing characteristics:
1) he can observe every transmission in the network;
2) he has full access to information about the encoding and
decoding schemes;
3) he is computationally bounded and thus unable to break
hard cryptographic primitives;
4) he can drop or erase packets in the network at will (traffic
relay refusal);
5) he can inject traffic in the network at will which allows
him, for example, to introduce bogus packets in the
network to decrease the diversity and robustness of the
system.
The focus of our contribution is on threats (1) – (3). Char-
acteristics (4) and (5) are dealt with at the end of Section III.
III. SECURITY SCHEME
We propose SPOC (Secure Practical Network Coding), a
security framework that exploits the interplay between the
intrinsic security of network coding and standard cryptographic
mechanisms with the goal of countering the threats described
in Section II.
To deal with characteristics 1–3 of the attacker profile, SPOC
introduces modifications to RLNC based protocols (e.g. PNC)
only at the source and receiver nodes. We define two types of
coefficients: (1) the unlocked coefficients, which are basically
a line of coefficients drawn from the identity matrix for each
coded packet, and (2) the locked coefficients, which are actually
used for encoding and decoding yet are encrypted with keys
that are available at the destination. The unlocked and locked
coefficients are concatenated and added to the packet header
whenever a new packet is generated.
The full set of coefficients (locked and unlocked) is processed
by the intermediate nodes following the exact same packet
mixing rules of the original RLNC based protocol. In other
words, there is no need to change the protocol at the inter-
mediate nodes. This is made possible by using an encryption
system whose output ciphertext is of the same size as the
plaintext, e.g. AES. Our approach thus has the advantage that
encryption of coefficients is required only once for each packet
in a certain generation (see Section II).
At the destination nodes, the unlocked coefficients are of
major relevance since they store the operations performed along
the network upon the locked coefficients. Only after reversing
the operations performed along the network, can the destination
nodes decrypt the locked coefficients and, thus, have access to
the hidden information.
It is important to stress that the unlocked coefficients do not
provide any information for effectively decoding the packets
without access to a decrypted version of the locked coefficients
– they only indicate whether the packets are linearly indepen-
dent or not, and are used for the execution of several steps
of original RLNC based protocols. Moreover, the payload can
be deemed to be secure against the described threats since
each symbol results from a linear combination with random
coefficients that are locked by our scheme and thus inaccessible
to the attacker.
Apart from the typical requirements for encryption mech-
anisms, such as efficiency and strong security, our scheme
requires an encryption mechanism with ciphertext size equal
to that of the plaintext. This enables intermediate nodes to run
operations on the locked coefficients without the need for the
decryption keys. To exemplify this, let us consider symbols with
8 bits (i.e. field size of 28). For each packet sent in a certain
generation, the h coefficients are concatenated resulting in a
string of h bytes of plaintext. The string of plaintext coefficients
is then encrypted (or “locked”) as a whole, resulting in h bytes
of ciphertext. The ciphertext is then divided into h blocks of
8 bits, each of them corresponding to an encrypted locked
coefficient ready to be sent in a packet.
To illustrate the basic principles of the proposed scheme, Fig-
ure 3 presents the canonical network coding example of Sec-
tion I with the modifications introduced by our approach. The
operations in this example can be described as follows.
1) The source node 1 randomly generates the locked coef-
ficients and encrypts them with the keys shared with the
sink nodes 6 and 7 using one of the already mentioned
cryptosystems. The unlocked coefficients of each packet
are simply distinct lines of the identity matrix which allow
subsequent nodes to check if the packets are linearly
independent or not, and carry out the protocol using this
information;
2) The subsequent intermediate nodes perform the usual
combination of packets (e.g. node 4 combines the packets
received from nodes 2 and 3 using the (1, 1) encoding
vector). The intermediate nodes do not differentiate be-
tween the locked and unlocked coefficients, in that they
perform exactly the same operations on both;
3) When sufficient information reaches the destination nodes
6 and 7, they recover the original locked coefficients
using the knowledge of the transformation they suffered
– available through the unlocked coefficients. Then, they
Fig. 3. Basic scheme. White parts of packets represent clear-text information,
whereas encrypted information is shaded in grey. In practice, the initial locked
coefficients in grey – (3,2) and (5,1) – are encrypted to other symbols of the
same size. For illustration purposes, the scheme is simplified using integers.
decrypt the locked coefficients and compute the product
with the unlocked coefficients. The destination nodes
finally perform Gaussian elimination to recover the native
packets.
A formal description of our scheme is provided in Table I.
As mentioned above, we consider two types of active attacks
((4) and (5) in the list of Section II). The first type of attack,
traffic relay refusal, can be viewed as a special case of loss or
erasure of packets in a network. Their impact is already reduced
by the properties of RLNC (see [3]), from which our protocol
benefits. As for the second type of attack, i.e. the injection
of malicious bogus traffic in the network, we can extend the
“Shared Secret Model” from the protocol presented in [14] in
the following way. The source and sinks share secret keys,
which can be used to share some extra redundancy on the
original information sent by the source. This helps the sinks
to infer, for each generation, the modifications introduced by
the active attacker on the packets flowing in the network. For
each generation, the source sends a secret composed of a parity-
check matrix and a hash matrix equal to its product with the
matrix of information generated by the source. The information
present in the unlocked coefficients and the shared secret is then
used at the sinks to detect active attacks and decode the original
information. This solution achieves a rate of h − z0, where h
is the original capacity of the network – the number of packets
in a generation – and z0 is the rate of packets injected by the
adversary.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF SPOC
Initialization (source nodes):
• A key management mechanism is used to exchange shared keys
with the sink nodes, which are used for the encryption of the locked
coefficients (see also Section II).
• The source node stores the message packets w1, w2, ...,wh in its
memory;
• The source node forms a random linear combination of the h packets
in its memory (the current generation) and puts it in a packet to be
sent;
• The coefficients corresponding to a distinct line of the h × h
identity matrix are added to the header of each coded packet. These
correspond to the unlocked coefficients;
• The packet’s global encoding vector is encrypted with the shared
keys and also placed in the header of each packet. These correspond
to the locked coefficients.
Operation at intermediate nodes:
• When a packet is received by a node, the node stores the packet in
its memory;
• To transmit on an outgoing link, the node produces a packet by
forming a random linear combination of the packets in its buffer,
modifying both the unlocked and locked coefficients without dis-
tinction, according to the rules of standard RLNC based protocols.
Decoding (sink nodes):
• When sufficient packets are received:
– Using the unlocked coefficients (which store the operations per-
formed upon the locked coefficients throughout the network),
the receiver reverts those operations thus obtaining the original
locked coefficients;
– The receiver then decrypts the locked coefficients;
– The receiver determines the decoding matrix by computing
the product of the unlocked coefficients and the corresponding
locked coefficients;
– Gaussian elimination is then performed to recover the original
packets.
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IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Seeking performance evaluation criteria that are technology
independent, we focus on encryption volume, space require-
ments and computational overhead of SPOC.
Encryption Volume: To illustrate SPOC’s efficiency in com-
parison to traditional end-to-end encryption, Figure 4 compares
TABLE II
VOLUME OVERHEAD OF LOCKED COEFFICIENTS (PER PACKET).
MAXIMUM IP
PACKET SIZE
#CODED
PACKETS h
OVERHEAD IN Fq
q = 28 q = 216
1500
20 1.3% 2.7%
50 3.3% 6.7%
100 6.7% 13.3%
200 13.3% 26.7%
5000
20 0.4% 0.8%
50 1.0% 2.0%
100 2.0% 4.0%
200 4.0% 8.0%
8192
20 0.2% 0.5%
50 0.6% 1.2%
100 1.2% 2.4%
200 2.4% 4.8%
the volume of data to be encrypted according to the size of
the plaintext. We consider a maximum payload size of 1480
bytes (a typical value e.g. for the Ethernet) and assume that
each generation encoded by SPOC has h coded packets. In the
case of the traditional encryption mechanism, which performs
end-to-end encryption of the entire payload, the volume of
data that must be encrypted increases linearly with the size
of the protected payload. It is not difficult to see that, by
encrypting solely the locked coefficients, SPOC substantially
reduces the size of information to be encrypted (both in the
case of 8 bit and 16 bit coefficients), while still guaranteeing
strong confidentiality of the payload.
Notice that the size of information to be encrypted by our
scheme increases in discrete steps, because it is only when the
payload size surpasses the maximum payload size of a typical IP
packet that a new set of h locked coefficients must be generated
and included in the next IP packet. It is also important to notice
that if we consider IP packets which can contain more than the
maximum payload size of typical IP packets (1480 bytes), the
relative gains of our scheme are deemed even higher than for
this specific case. This happens because more data can be sent
in each packet containing the same set locked coefficients.
Naturally, the required number of cryptographic operations
is directly related to the aforementioned volume of data (to
be encrypted). If we consider a stream cipher, the number of
operations to perform while encrypting increases linearly with
that volume, and therefore, the number of operations is greatly
reduced by SPOC as shown in Figure 4. In the case of a
block cipher such as AES (with blocks of length 128 bits) each
encryption operation allows up to 128 bits of input data, i.e. 16
coefficients in a field of size 28, or 8 coefficients in a field of
size 216.
Space requirements: The ability to reduce the volume of
data to be encrypted comes at the cost of including locked
coefficients in the data packet. Assuming the use of an en-
cryption mechanism in which the ciphertext has the same size
of the plaintext (e.g. AES in stream cipher mode), the overall
transmission overhead for a generation of h coded packets
depends on the maximum IP packet size.
In Table II we show the overhead introduced by SPOC for
each packet and for coefficients with size of 8 and 16 bits. The
overhead values are obtained by calculating the ratio between
the size of the locked coefficients and the maximum size of an
TABLE III
COMPUTATIONAL COST OF INCLUDING THE LOCKED COEFFICIENTS, PER GENERATION
OF SIZE h.
NODE OPERATION DETAILED
COST
TOTAL
COST
Source
Node
Generation of vectors of identity
matrix
negligible O(h2)
Encryption of locked coefficients See Section IV
Performing extra random linear op-
erations
h2 multiplica-
tion and (h −
1)h sums
Intermediate
Node
Performing extra random linear op-
erations (combining n packets)
nh multiplica-
tion operations
and (n − 1)h
sum operations
O(nh)
Sink node
Inverse of the unlocked coeffi-
cients’ matrix MU , M−1U
O(h3)
O(h3)
Product MP of M−1U with the
locked coefficients’ matrix MˆL ,
MP = M
−1
U
× MˆL
O(h3)
Decrypt locked coefficients to ob-
tain the matrix ML of plain-text
locked coefficients
See Section IV
The product M = MU × ML ,
to obtain the final matrix in which
Gaussian Elimination will be per-
formed
O(h3)
IP packet. As the number h of packets to encode increases, so
does the packet size overhead, since each new packet to encode
adds a new locked coefficient to the IP packet. For high values
of h, the overhead can become significant, in particular for IP
packets of small size (e.g. coding 200 packets and taking a
maximum IP packet size of 1500 bytes (including the 20 byte
header) results in a overhead of 13.3% in a field with size 28
and 26.7% in a field with size 216). However, this overhead can
be significantly reduced by increasing the packet size (e.g. for
the same 200 coded packets, the overhead can be reduced until
2.4% in a field with size 28 and 4.8% in a field with size 216).
Computational overhead: Due to the inclusion of an extra set
of coefficients (the locked coefficients), SPOC introduces addi-
tional operations at network nodes that do not exist in standard
RLNC based protocols. The computational overhead is different
for the source, intermediate and destination nodes. In Table III,
we provide a detailed evaluation of the computational overhead
of SPOC.
For the purpose of our analysis, we consider that, in compar-
ison to the multiplication, the sum operation yields negligible
complexity. We consider a naı¨ve approach for matrix multi-
plication, which takes O(n3) operations. Although there exist
algorithms with lower computational complexity, the resulting
improvements are minor, and usually apply only to very large
matrices. Since including large sets of packets in each genera-
tion (i.e. large h) requires us to perform Gaussian elimination
on large matrices and increases the overhead of network coding
protocols (in terms of additional coefficients to include in a
packet), we consider this approach for matrix multiplication
reasonable for the scope of our analysis.
V. FINAL REMARKS
We presented a security scheme that assures confidentiality in
network coding protocols based on the interplay between the
coding properties in this paradigm and cryptographic mech-
anisms. Specifically, we attained a substantial reduction on
the size of the data to be encrypted when compared to the
naı¨ve encryption approach (where the whole data needs to be
encrypted) and, consequently, a reduction of the computational
overhead required to perform encryption. Confidentiality is
achieved by protecting (or “locking”) the source coefficients
required to decode the linearly coded data, and by letting
intermediate nodes run their operations on a set of coefficients
composed by the “unlocked” and the “locked” coefficients that
do not impair any of the operations of practical network coding
protocols. Active attacks can be countered by the use of a
shared secret between source and sinks, to help detect the
errors introduced by the attacker with inherent capacity and
complexity trade-offs. As part of our ongoing work, we are
considering the interplay between our network coding security
scheme and priority encoding transmission, as well as security
mechanisms to address Byzantine attacks on network coding.
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